Individual Liability of Supervisors for Sexual Harrassment Under Title VII: Courts\u27 Reliance on the Rules of Statutory Construction by Connolly, Scott J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 42
Issue 2 Number 2 Article 5
3-1-2001
Individual Liability of Supervisors for Sexual
Harrassment Under Title VII: Courts' Reliance on
the Rules of Statutory Construction
Scott J. Connolly
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott J. Connolly, Individual Liability of Supervisors for Sexual Harrassment Under Title VII: Courts'
Reliance on the Rules of Statutory Construction, 42 B.C.L. Rev. 421 (2001),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol42/iss2/5
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF SUPERVISORS
FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE
VII: COURTS' RELIANCE ON THE RULES
OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Abstract: The United States Supreme Court has not considered the
issue of individual liability under Title VII for workplace sexual
harassment. There is, however, almost complete consensus on this issue
among the federal courts. Only the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit has refused explicitly to rule on the issue.
Several district courts in the First Circuit allow supervisors to be sued in
their individual capacities under Title VII. Other district courts,
however, have rejected such lawsuits. This Note reviews the case law
addressing the issue of individual liability of supervisors under Title VII,
and concludes that Title VII imposes liability only on employers. Simply
stated, supervisors cannot be sued as individuals under Title VII.
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") is a federal
statute that protects employees from sexual harassment in the work-
place) Specifically, Title VII prohibits workplace practices that dis-
criminate because of sex for no bona fide job-related reason. 2 For ex-
ample, under Title VII an employer is subject to damages and
equitable remedies for discriminatory hiring and promotion practices
1 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub, L. No 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000h (1994)). Title VII declares that "lilt shall
he an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in , any way which would deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
§ 2000e-2; see also Meritor Savings Bank, ESP v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (recogniz-
ing two categories of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work environment).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Title VII also,prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religitin and national origin. See id.
421
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and sex-related conduct that has a sufficiently adverse affect on the
employee's work environment. 3
If the court finds that the employer has violated Title VII, the
court may order the employer to pay back-pay, compensatory dam-
ages and punitive damages to the employee. 4 The court may also or-
der appropriate injunctive relief. 5
 For example, the court can enjoin
the employer from continuing discriminatory workplace practices
such as maintaining a formal policy of treating women differently
than men for no bona fide reason based upon the requirements of
the particular job. 6
Despite Title VII's mandate against sexual harassment in the
workplace, there remains some disagreement among federal courts—
especially among federal district courts within the First Circuit—as to
whether supervisors may be sued in their individual capacities for
sexual harassment.? This controversy results from the statute's argua-
3 See id. at § 2000e-5(b),(g) (1); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786-88
(1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-58 (1998); Oncale v. Sun-
downer Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-80 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993); Merit()); 477 U.S. at 62-70.
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
5
 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1) .
6 See id.; Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 702 (1978)
(requiring female employees to pay more than men into pension plan is prohibited dispa-
rate treatment).
7 See Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 444 (1st Cir. 1997) (recog-
nizing the controversy, declaring that "it] he question has no very obvious answer," and
declining to address this "relatively complex issue."); Homey v. Westfield Gage Co., 95 F.
Supp. 2d 29, 33 (D. Mass. 2000) (collecting cases and rejecting individual liability of super-
visors under Title VII); Wyss v. General Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202, 204-09 (D.R.I.
1998) (holding individual supervisors liable); Chatman v. Gentle Dental Ctr. of Waltham,
973 F. Supp. 228, 236-40 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that individuals are not personally li-
able under Title VII); Contreras-Bordallo v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya De Puerto Rico, 952 F.
Supp. 72, 73-74 (D.P.R. 1997) (same); Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562, 572
(D.R.1. 1996) (holding supervisors liable under Title VII because they are agents of the
employer); Ruffino v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1048 (D. Mass.
1995) (holding supervisors "bound by Title VII's dictates"). The consensus among federal
circuit courts of appeal is that Title VII does not provide for individual liability of supervi-
sors. See, e.g., Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998);
Wathen v. General Elec. Co. 115 F.3d 400, 403-06 (6th Cir. 1997); Sheridan v. E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 100•F.3d 1061, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1996); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898,
899-901 (10th Cir. 1996); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Sei-
ler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-16 (2d Cir. 1995); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d. 552, 554-55
(7th Cir. 1995); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3(1 649, 651-52 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1015 (1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Intl, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993);
Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Patrick J. McGrath,
Ambiguity Surrounding Individual Sexual Harassment Liability on the Federal and State Level in
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bly ambiguous definition of the term "employer." 8 Although Title
VII's language addresses explicitly an employer's conduct, it defines
the term employer to include employers with certain characteristics
"and any agent of such a person . ." 9 It is this "and any agent clause"
that has caused courts to disagree about whether supervisors can be
sued in their individual capacities. 1° Some courts interpret the "and
any agent" as unambiguously providing for individual liability of su-
pervisors." Supervisors are common law agents of the employer after
all, they reason." The majority of courts, however, interpret the "and
any agent" clause as an expression of Congress's intent to incorporate
the concept of respondeat superior within Title VI1. 15 In other words,
the clause ensures that employers will be held liable for the conduct
of all of their agents, including supervisors."
Because Title VII is a statute, perhaps it. is unsurprising that
courts support their construction of the "and any agent" clause using
various rules of statutory construction. 15 Simply stated, the rules of
statutory construction are a commonly accepted technical framework
for determining what the language of a statute means in any given
Massachusetts, 3 SUFFOLK j. TRIAL & APPELLATE Anvoc. 1 29 (1998) (collecting cases; noting
that the First Circuit has not yet decided this issue and that district courts hi the First Cir-
cuit are split; and, calling for the First Circuit: to resolve the controversy).
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) ('"fhe term employer means a person engaged in an indus-
try affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each
of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calender year, and any agrnt
of such person . .") (emphasis supplied); Harney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33; McGrath, supra note
7, at 133-140.
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
10 Compare, e.g., lacampo, 929 F. Stipp. at 571-72 (interpreting the clause to allow indi-
vidual liability of supervisors); Weeks v State of Maine, 871 F. Supp. 515,515 (D. Me. 1994)
(same) with Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp. 2d 288,288 (Ii Mass, 1998) (rejecting individ-
ual liability) and Chatman, 973 F. Supp. at 236 (same).
1 ' See lacampo, 929 F. Supp. at 571-72; Ruffin°, 908 F. Supp. at 1048.
12 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204-08; Ruffin°, 908 F. Supp. at 1048.
13 See Millet; 991 F.2d at 587; McGrath, supra note 7, at 135-36.
19
 See, e.g., Millet; 991 F.2d at 587.
1° See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. Ctit. L. REv. 800,806 (1983) (noting that courts frequently use the rules of statutory
construction to interpret statutes even though their utility has been criticized by scholars
like Professor Llewellyn); Llewellyn, infra note 16, at 400-06.
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situation. 16
 "If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous it
must be given effect" is one rule, for example. 17
What is perhaps most interesting about the controversy over indi-
vidual liability of supervisors for sexual harassment is the extent to
which courts rely on the rules of statutory construction to support
their decisions.° This reliance has brought to light again the rules'
primary limitation.° For every rule, there is an equally valid but op-
posing rule which, when applied, will yield an opposite conclusion."
"Although plain and unambiguous, statutory language will not be
given effect when a literal interpretation would lead to absurd or mis-
chievous consequences or thwart the statute's manifest purpose" is the
opposing rule to the rule last mentioned. 21 Although application of
opposing rules will lead to opposite conclusions, both conclusions are
"correct" in that they follow logically from applying a rule of statutory
construction.22
The United States Supreme Court has not considered the issue of
individual liability under Title VII." There is, however, almost com-
plete consensus on this issue among the federal circuit courts of ap-
pea1. 24
 Currently, the United States Courts of Appeal for the Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits have rejected individual liability for supervi-
sors. 25
 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
rejected individual liability for supervisors under a state human rights
16 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About Now Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400-06 (1950) (cataloging the
rules and explaining their primary limitation: "there are two opposing canons on almost
every point."). Professor Llewellyn seems to conclude that the rules are more properly
"tools of argument". See id. at 401.
17 See id. at 403.
is See, e.g., Ruffino, 908 F. Stipp. 1019, 1047-48 (relying on the rule: every word and
clause must be given effect).
19 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-06 ("The usual
criticism of the canons [of statutory construction] ... is that for every canon one might
bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon so that the outcome of the
interpretative process depends on the choice between paired opposites—a choice the can-
ons themselves do not illuminate.").
20 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401 (contrasting the "thrust" of one rule with the
"parry" of an opposing, but equally valid rule). Professor Llewellyn gives substantial credit
for his "thrust and parry" organization to Charles Driscoll. Id. at 395. See also Posner, supra
note 15, at 805-06.
21
 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 903.
22 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
23 See Grant, 21 F.3d at 649.
24 See Homey, 95 F. Stipp. 2d at 33; McGrath, supra note 7, at 133-34.
29 See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3(1 at 1313; Grant, 21 F.3(1 at 651.
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statute analogous to Title VII, even though the court has yet to decide
the issue definitively under Title VII. 26 Indeed, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals is the only federal appeals court that has refused to rule
explicitly on the issue. 27 Federal district courts within the First Circuit
have disagreed on the question of individual liability for supervisors. 28
Several district courts in the First Circuit allow supervisors to be sued
in their individual capacities under Title VII. 29 Other courts, however,
have rejected such lawsuits."
This Note reviews the case law addressing the issue of individual
liability of supervisors under Title VII and emphasizes the current
split among federal district courts in the First Circuit." Like the ma-
jority of courts, I conclude that Title VII imposes liability only on em-
ployers—people or entities employing fifteen or more employees in
an industry affecting commerce." Simply stated, supervisors cannot
be sued as individuals under Title VII. 33 In addition, my purpose in
analyzing the current state of the law is to alert observers and practi-
tioners to courts' reliance on the rules of statutory construction and
which rules are likely to be relied on by a court addressing this issue."
Part I provides background for the reader concerning the history of
sexual harassment." Part II reviews the current state of the law con-
cerning individual liability of supervisors under Title VII in the fed-
eral courts—especially in the First Circuit." In Part II, I also discuss
the courts' reliance on the rules of statutory construction and explain
that the controversy brings to light again the primary limitation of the
26 See Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F,3d 377,381 (8th Cir. 1995) (interpret-
ing Missouri Human Rights Act).
27 See Morrison, 108 F.3d at 444 (declining to rule on whether supervisors are liable in
individual capacities tinder Title VII); Haney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
28 Compare lacampo, 929 F. Stipp. at 562 (holding supervisors personally liable under
Title VII); Rnffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; and Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515 (same) with Harney,
95 F. Supp. 2d at 33 (rejecting individual liability of supervisors under Title VII); Meara, 27
F. Supp. 2d at 288 (same); and Chatman, 973 F. Supp. at 228 (same).
29 See lacampo, 929 F. Supp. at 562; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at
515 .
m See Harney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33; Meara, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 288; Chat man, 973 F. Supp.
at 228.
31 Compare lacatnpo, 929 F. Supp. at 562; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; and Birks, 871 F.
Supp. at 515;; with Homey, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33; Meara, 27 F. Stipp. 2d at 288; and Chatman,
973 F. Supp. at 228.
S2 See infra notes 202-288 and accompanying text.
33 See Miller; 991 F.2d at 583; Busby, 931 F.2d at 772.
34 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-06.
SS See infra notes 43-87 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 88-201 and accompanying text.
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rules.37 Part HI argues that the better reasoned view is that, under Ti-
tle VII, there is no individual liability for supervisors and that a plain-
tiff-employee's sole remedy is against his or her employer." Applica-
tion of the rules of statutory construction provides more than one
"right" answer." Moreover, the legislative history concerning sexual
harassment in general and Title VIPs "and any agent clause," in par-
ticular, is completely lacking. 4° As a result, support for my conclusion
is based largely on a common sense evaluation of the current problem
of sexual harassment in the workplace, the resources available to
combat it, and the language and structure of Title VII's remedial
framework.41 I conclude that expanding Title VII's reach to include
liability for individual supervisors is unwarranted. 42
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII provides that it is unlawful for employers to fail to hire or
fire anyone because of their sex. 42 In addition, Title VII makes it ille-
" See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-06.
38
 See infra notes 202-287 and accompanying text.
" Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-06.
40 The principal aim of Title VII's drafters was to prohibit race discrimination by em-
ployers against African Americans and that the inclusion of "sex" in the statute was a elev-
enth-hour tactical move by opponents to prevent Title VIPs enactment. See, e.g., Thomas C.
Kohler, The Employment Relation and Its Ordering at Century's End: Reflections on Emerging
Trends in the United States, 41 B.C. L. REV. 103,115-16 (1999). This explains the lack of
legislative history on the subject of sex discrimination in general and sexual harassment in
particular. See id. Because of the lack of legislative history, much of the substantive law con-
cerning discrimination because of sex has come from the courts. See id. (Itlhe prohibition
against sexual discrimination was a last-minute addition to [Title VII] by its legislative op-
ponents, who had hoped that its inclusion would result in the statute's defeat. Despite the
addition of the new category and the lack of any debate about its scope and meaning, the
amended version of Title VII quickly was passed and became law. Bereft of legislative his-
tory to guide it, the interpretation of Title VII's prohibition of sexual discrimination has
posed some considerable challenges for the judiciary."); see also Meritot; 477 U.S. at 63
("Nile prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last
minute on the floor of the House of Representatives ... the bill quickly passed as
amended, and we are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's
prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex'") citing 110 Cong.Rec. 2577-2584
(1964); Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1323 (dissenting opinion).
41
 Courts have not relied exclusively on the rules of statutory construction to support
their decisions. See, e.g., Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 (analyzing Title VD's structure to determine
Congressional intent); Homey, 95 F. Stipp. 2d at 33-36 (same). Indeed all courts look to
the language and structure of Title VII as well. See McGrath, supra note 7, at 133-140.
42 See infra notes 201-88 and accompanying text.
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994). Specifically, section 2000e-2(a) (1) provides,
"Lilt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
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gal for an employer to discriminate against anyone with regard to
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges because of his or her
sex." The term employer is defined in Title VII as "a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person
."45 Early on, courts held that Title VII's prohibition against sex
discrimination encompassed only disparate treatment such as an em-
ployer's refusal to hire or promote employees into positions for which
they were otherwise qualified because of their sex.° More recently,
however, federal courts have interpreted Title VII to prohibit sexual
harassment in the workplace. 47
Generally, sexual harassment may be defined as a type of em-
ployment discrimination that includes unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sex and other sexual conduct prohibited by federal or
state law.48 In its decisions, the United States Supreme Court has rec-
ognized two categories of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile
work environment. 49 Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when a
job applicant or employee suffers a tangible adverse employment ac-
tion for refusing the sexual advances of her employer or supervisor. 50
A tangible adverse employment action includes not only decisions
that affect the hiring and promotion of employees, but also the reas-
signment of employees to less desirable tasks," In contrast, hostile
work environment sexual harassment occurs when employees are sub-
jected to abusive behavior in the workplace "because of their sex. 52
For a hostile work environment to exist, the harassment must be
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's . . . sex." Id.
44 See id. at § 2000e-2(a) (2).
45 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
46 See Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 435 U.S. 702, 702 (1978); Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (rejecting married female applicant but
imposing no marital requirements on men is prohibited discrimination).
47 See Burlington Industries, lnc.v. Ellerth, .524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998); Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69-67 (1986).
48 See BLACK'S LAW DIC'T'IONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1969); see also Ellerth, 529 U.S. at. 752;
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-67; .
49 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-67.
6° See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790
(1998).
52 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-68.
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sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
employment."
To prevail in a quid pro quo sexual harassment case, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that they suffered tangible adverse employment actions
that result from their rejection of sexual advances made by their em-
ployer or the employer's agent. 54
 When an agent of the employer,
such as a supervisor, inflicts a tangible adverse employment action on
an employee for rejecting a sexual advance, courts have determined
that the employer is vicariously liable for the supervisor's actions." In
other words, the acts of the supervisor are imputed to the employer
and legal responsibility for the supervisor's actions rests with the em-
ployer.56
In contrast, hostile work environment claims involve no tangible
adverse employment action. 57 In a hostile work environment case,
plaintiffs can prevail by proving that they were subjected to harassing
conduct that altered the terms and conditions of their employment. 58
To be actionable, the conduct must be unwelcome, sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter a term or condition of employment and "because
sex.59
 Whether conduct is unwelcome is determined by subjective
factors.° For example, an employee's voluntary participation or ac-
ceptance of offensive conduct does not mean that the conduct was
welcome; however, evidence that the employee invited and joined in
the conduct probably would bar an employee's claim of hostile work
environment. 61 Further, whether harassment is sufficiently severe or
pervasive is determined by looking at the totality of the circum-
stances.62 The totality of the circumstances includes factors such as the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether the
conduct is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive
utterance and whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance.° Finally, the discriminating conduct
53 See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 10, 21 (1993).
54 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752; AIM:or; 477 U.S. at 64-68.
55 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802-03.
55 See id.
57 See id. at 786.
56 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-23.
59 See Faragher; 524 U.S. at 790; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Serv. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998); Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Meriloi; 477 U.S. at 64.
60 See Meritm; 477 U.S. at 68.
61 See id.
62 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
63 See id. at 23.
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must be "because or sex.64 Courts have found gender-specific har-
assment, unwelcothe conduct of a sexual nature and conduct moti-
vated by sexual desire to be "because of sex. 65
In 1986, the Supreme Court first recognized hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 66 In Meri-
tar, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may establish a violation of
Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex created a hostile
or abusive work environment. 67
The Court rejected explicitly the contention that, to prevail,
plaintiffs must show a tangible economic effect on their employment
condition. 66 The Court reasoned that the language of Title VII is not
limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination. 69 Rather, the
phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in Title VII
demonstrates that Congress's purpose in enacting Title VII was to
prohibit a broad spectrum of workplace disparate treatment based on
sex." Thus, severe or pervasive sexual harassment could affect the
terms and conditions of a person's employment just as severely as
other forms of discrimination. 71
The Supreme Court in Meritor did not address what conduct is
sufficiently "severe" or "pervasive" to transform the workplace into a
hostile work environment. 72 In 1993, in Harris v. Fcn*lift Systems, Inc.,
however, the Supreme Court held that Title VII is violated when the
workplace is permeated by discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1); Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
65 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
66 See 477 U.S. at 64-65.
67 See id. at 73.
68 See id. at 64-65.
69 See id. at 64-67.
7° See id. at 64.
71 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. The Supreme Court's rationale in holding that sexually ,
hostile work environments violated Title VII paralleled the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit's rationale in Rogers e EEOC. See id. at 65-68; Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 234
(5th Cir. 1971). In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit became the first court to hold that racial dis-
crimination could create a discriminatory work environment. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
The plaintiff in Rogers was Hispanic and claimed that her employer's discriminatory service
to Hispanic customers created an offensive work environment for employees. See id. The
Fifth Circuit based its reasoning on the relevant language of Title VII which states: it shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his ... terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... ." Id.
72 See Methor; 477 U.S. at 57; North, 510 U.S. at 21-24.
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insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of a
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment."
The Court determined that whether a work environment is "hos-
tile" or "abusive" depends upon a number of factors including the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether the
conduct is physically threatening or humiliating and whether the
conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee's work perform-
ance." Furthermore, the Court determined that whether the harass-
ment seriously affected the worker's psychological well-being or had
led her to stiffer injury was not necessary to a finding of actionable
sexual harassment.'"
Neither Meritor nor Harris addressed definitively the question as
to what circumstances the employer is liable for its employees' dis-
criminatory conduct." In 1986, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the
Supreme Court addressed directly the issue of employer liability for
the actions of its employees." In Faragher, the Supreme Court held
that an employer is vicariously liable for actionable discrimination
caused by a supervisor with immediate or successively higher author-
ity over the employee-victim." Further, the Court held that the em-
ployer's liability in a hostile work environment case, where no tangi-
ble employment action is taken, is subject to an employer's affirmative
defense.'" If the employer proves that it exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior and
that the plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or to avoid harm otherwise, then the employer is not liable.° The
Court reasoned that providing the employer with an affirmative de-
fense strikes a balance between the interests of the employer and the
employee-victim. 81
 On the one hand, the Court recognized strict vi-
carious liability in quid pro quo cases to protect employees from tan-
73
 See510 U.S. at 21-24.
74 See id. at 23.
75 See id. at 21.
76 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 17; Merita6 477 U.S. at 7. Although the issue was raised in 4V1eri-
tor, the Supreme Court merely stated that Congress intended courts to consider common
law agency principles in resolving this question. See Mentor, 477 U.S. at 72.
" See 524 U.S. at 775.
78 See id. at 807.
79 See id.
8° See id.
81 See id. at 806-07.
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gible adverse employment actions." On the other hand, the court
recognized an affirmative defense for the employer in hostile work
environment cases to encourage the employer to implement work-
place policies prohibiting sexual harassment and also to encourage
employee-victims to report incidents of sexual harassment to the em-
ployer."
The responsibility for defining sexual harassment under Title VII
has generally fallen on the federal courts, especially since the Su-
preme Court's decisions in Meritor, Harris and Faragher84 Presently,
employers, at least those employing fifteen or more employees, are on
notice that their active participation in sexually discriminatory em-
ployment practices or failure to police sexually hostile work environ-
ments that violate Title VII will result in liability to employee-victims. 85
As a result, Title Vll's objective of eliminating sexually discriminatory
employment practices has been furthered substantially. 86 One ques-
tion that remains open—at least in the First Circuit—is whether su-
pervisors, who themselves do not employ fifteen or more employees,
can be found personally liable for conduct that violates Title V11. 87
II. COURTS APPLY DIFFERENT RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
TO EITHER ACCEPT OR REJECT INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF SUPERVISORS
FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
Professor Karl N. Llewellyn thoroughly catalogued the rules of
statutory construction in a 1950 law review article.88 He also explained
the primary limitation of their use in interpreting statutes. 89 His thesis
was that, in any situation requiring the interpretation of a statute,
52 See Faragher; 524 U.S. at 806-07.
83 See id.
84 See Faragher; 524 U.S. at 775; Harris, 510 U.S. at 17; Mentor, 477 U.S. at 72.
en See Faragher; 524 U.S. at 775; Harris, 510 U.S. at 17; Mentor, 477 U.S. at 72.
86 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775; Harris, 510 U.S. at 17; Mentor, 477 U.S. at 72.
87 See Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 444 (1st Cir. 1997) (refus-
ing to decide whether Title VII imposes individual liability). Compare, e.g., lacampo v. Has-
bro, Inc., 929 F. Stipp. 562, 571-72 (D.R.I. 1996) (interpreting the clause to allow individ-
ual liability of supervisors); Ruffin() v. State Street Bank & Trust. Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019,
1047-48 (D. Mass. 1995) (same); and Weeks v State of Maine, 871 F. Supp. 515, 515 (D.
Me. 1994) (same) with Homey v Westfield Cage Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32-33 (D. Mass.
2000) (rejecting individual liability); Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp. 2d 288, 288 (D. Mass.
1998) (same) and Chatman v. Gentle Dental Cu'. of Waltham, 973 F. Stipp. 228, 236 (D.
Mass. 1997) (same),
68 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401-06.
" See id. at 401.
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there are at least two opposing rules. 90
 When applied, the rules lead
to different conclusions and there will always be at least two "correct"
interpretations.91
Although the "and any agent" clause in Title VIPs definition of
employer is arguably ambiguous, Congress did not explicitly provide
for individual liability of supervisors in either the original language of
Title VII or in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 92
 Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court has never considered the question of personal
liability of supervisors under Title VII. 93 Because Title VII's prohibi-
tions are directed to "employers," some courts have disagreed as to
whether Title VII's definition of "employer" should be construed to
mean that individual supervisors are "statutory employers" personally
liable for violations of Title VII. 94
Title VII makes it unlawful for an "employer to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual [j because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin." 95
 Moreover, Title VII defines "employer"
as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees" and "any agent of such a person."96 Unfor-
tunately, Title VII's drafters did not define further the term "agent,"
or explain the meaning and purpose of the "and any agent" clause. 97
Thus, courts have been forced to interpret the meaning of the "and
any agent" clause." All courts that have addressed this issue have re-
lied at least in part on the rules of statutory construction to interpret
" See id.
91 See id. at 401-06; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-06.
92 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). The 1991 Civil Rights Act amended Title VII by
providing compensatory and punitive damages for violations of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b) (1994). Congress found that "additional remedies under Federal law are
needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace." Id.
95 See Grant v. Lone Star Co., B.L.,21 F.3d 649, 649 (5th Cir. 1994).
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); compare, e.g., lacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562,
571-72 (D.R.I. 1996); Ruffino v. Slate Street Bank & Trust Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1047-48
(D. Mass. 1995); and Weeks v. State of Maine, 871 F. Supp. 515, 515 (D. Me. 1994) with
Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp. 2d 288, 288 (D. Mass. 1998) and Chatman v. Gentle Dental
Ctr. of Waltham, 973 F. Supp. 228, 236 (D. Mass. 1997).
95 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
99 Id. at § 2000e(b) .
97 See id.
99 See Wathen v Gen'l Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir.1996); Sheridan v. E.I.
DuPont de Nesnotars & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077-78 (3rd Cir. 1996); Toinka v. Seiler Corp.,
66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2t1 Cir. 1995); Grant, 21 F.3d at 649; Miller v. Maxwells' Intl Inc., 991
E2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).
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the "and any agent" clause and decide whether supervisors may be
sued under Title VII in their individual capacities. 99
A. Most Federal Appellate Courts Apply Rules of Construction to Reject
Individual Liability of Supervisors for Sexual Harassment Under Title VII.
Whether the drafters included the "and any agent" clause to al-
low agents of the employer, such as supervisor-employees, to be held
individually liable for their conduct initially caused much disagree-
ment among federal appellate courts. 190 Today, however, there is al-
most complete consensus. 1 ° 1 The list of federal appellate courts that
have rejected, or have reversed earlier decisions allowing individual
liability under Title VII for supervisors—who are not themselves em-
ployers of fifteen or more employees—includes the Courts of Appeals
for the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh and D. C. Circuits. 102 Only the Courts of Appeals for the First
and Eighth Circuits have not ruled definitively on the issue of indi-
vidual liability of supervisors under Title VII.'"
Many courts that have rejected individual liability recognize that
finding supervisors personally liable under Title VII is not completely
implausible because Title VII's "and any agent" clause is vague or am-
biguous. 104 Nevertheless, these courts have rejected individual liability
for supervisors finding, almost uniformly, that Title VII's statutory
scheme indicates clearly that Congress intended employers—not indi-
vidual employees—to be the proper defendants in Title VII lawsuits. 10
° See, e.g., Tomlin, 66 F.3d at 1313-14 ("the plain meaning of a statute is normally con-
trolling, except in the rare cases tin which] the literal application of a statute will produce
a result demonstrably at odds whit the intention of its drafters ... filn such cases, it is the
intentions of the legislators, rather than the strict language, that controls.").
ISO See Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 444 (1st Cir. 1997);
Wathen, 115 F.3d at 405; Sheridan, 100 F.Sd at 1077-78; Troika, 66 F.3d at 1313; Grant, 21
F.3d at 649; Miller; 991 F.2t1 at 587; Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 100 (4th
Cir,1989); /acampo, 929 F. Supp. at 571-72; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047-48; McGrath, su-
pra note 7, at 133.
101 See Homey v. Westfield Cage Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 29, 33 (0. Mass. 2000); Wyss v.
Gen'l Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202, 204 (D.R.1. 1998).
102 See Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998); Wathen,
115 F.3d at 403; Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1077-78; Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 899-901
(10th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 1995); 7'ontira, 66 F.3d at
1313; Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Grant, 21 F.3(1 at 651; Miller; 991
F.2d at 587; Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991).
In See, e.g., Morrison, 108 F.3d at 444; Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377,
381 (8th Cir. 1995).
104 See, e.g., Tornka, 66 F.3(1 at 1314.
los See id.; McGrath, supra note 7, at 133-40.
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Generally, these courts list five reasons why imposing personal
liability on individual supervisors under Title VII is improper. 106 First,
supervisors are not subject to Title VII in their individual capacities
because Title VII's definition of employer limits Title VII's application
to persons who employ fifteen or more employees. 107 In other words,
Title VII's plain language excludes individuals from liability unless
they employ a certain number of employees. 108 Second, under the
original version of Title VII, plaintiffs could only be awarded equita-
ble relief and back pay-remedies typically provided by an employer,
not by a supervisor in his or her individual capacity. 102 This indicates
that Congress never contemplated individual liability because em-
ployers typically have provided these remedies.'" Third, the 1991
Civil Rights Act caps compensatory and punitive damages for viola-
tions of Title VII at specific limits based on the number of workers
employed by the employer.'" These caps also signal that Congress did
not intend to provide for individual liability. 112 Because no cap is men-
tioned for individuals, it makes no sense that Congress would limit
liability for employers based on the size of their operations and sub-
ject individuals to unlimited liability.'" Fourth, because the legislative
history of Title VII indicates that no mention was made of individual
agent liability, Congress did not contemplate individual liability when
Title VII was enacted,'"
Finally, all courts that reject individual liability for supervisors
support their conclusion using the rules of statutory construction.'"
Courts vary in their reliance on these rules. 116 In deciding whether
Title VII's "and any agent" clause imposes individual liability on su-
106 See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; McGrath, supra note 7, at 133-40.
107 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; McGrath, supra note 7, at 136.
1°8 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; McGrath, supra note 7, at 1'36.
109 See Tomka, 66 F.3t1 at 1314-15; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137-38.
110 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314-15; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137-38.
HI See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137-38.
118 See Tomka, 66 F.3(1 at 1315; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137-38.
116 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (1994); see also Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315; McGrath, supra
note 7, at 137-38.
114 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314.
115 See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258,258 (5th Cir. 1999); Lissau,
159 F.3d at 180-83;1t'a:heti, 115 F.3(1 at 400; Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901; 1Villiams, 72 F.3d at 554;
Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; Gary, 59 F.3d at 1399; Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d at 402,402 (1995);
Millen 991 F.2d at 587; Busby, 931 F.2d at 772; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047-48.
116 See, e.g., Indest, 164 F.3(1 at 258; Lissau, 159 F.3d at 177; Mitten, 115 F.3d at 400;
Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901; Williams, 72 F.3d at 554; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; Gary, 59 F.3d at
1399; Smith, 45 F.3d at 402; Miller; 991 F.2d at 587; Busby, 931 F.2d at 772; Ruffino, 908 F.
Supp. at 1047-48.
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pervisors, courts frequently recite one or more of the following rules
of statutory interpretation: (1)a statute cannot go beyond its text;
(2)if the language is plain and unambiguous it must be given effect;
(3)when the literal interpretation [of statutory language] would lead
to absurd or mischievous consequences or thwart the manifest pur-
pose [of the statute] then plain and unambiguous language need not
be given effect; (4) if inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest
of the statute, words or clauses may be rejected as surplusage; and
(5)rules of grammar will be disregarded where strict adherence would
defeat [the] purpose [of the statute]. 117
If the drafters of Title VII did not intend the "and any agent"
clause to create individual liability for employees such as supervisors,
then what does the "and any agent" clause mean?118 Those courts re-
jecting individual liability under Title VII typically explain the "and
any agent" clause as merely incorporating the doctrine of respondeat
superior into the statute: conduct by a supervisor that violates Title
VII will be imputed to the employer who will be legally responsible. 118
For example, in 1993, in Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that liability did not extend to
individual employees for their violations of Title VII.'" The Ninth
Circuit stated summarily: "[t]he obvious purpose of this [agent] pro-
vision was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the stat-
ute."'" Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Title VII's
"statutory scheme" indicates that Congress did not intend to hold su-
pervisors directly liable because the plain language of Title VII limits
employer liability to those with fifteen or more employees. 122 Here,
the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the rules of statutory interpreta-
tion to support its assertion. 123 Additionally, the court found that
Congress's purpose in establishing this fifteen-employee floor was to
avoid burdening small employers with the costs of employment dis-
crimination litigation. 124 From this finding, the Ninth Circuit con-
1 " See Tontka, 66 F.3(1 at 1314-15; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047-48.
118 See Totnka, 66 F.3(1 at 1313-15.
115 See id. at 1313; McGrath, supra note 7, at 136.
120 991 F.2(1 at 587.
121 Id.
In See id.
121 See id. at 587-88. The Ninth Circuit relied on the rules of statutory construction
which state: one starts (their analysis] with the [plaint language of the statute, a statute
cannot go beyond its text and if the language is plain and unambiguous it must be given
effect. See id.
124 See id. at 587.
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cluded that "it is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil
liability to run against individual employees" who would presumably
be more greatly burdened by the costs associated with defending alle-
gations of employment discrimination under Title VII than would
small employers. 125
Similarly, in 1995, in Tomka v. Seiler corp., a split panel of the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals held that three supervisors could not be
held personally liable for sexual harassment under Title VII. 126
 Al-
though the Second Circuit's decision recognized that a narrow and
literal reading of Title VII's "and any agent" clause suggested that in-
dividual agents could be liable as statutory employers, the court re-
jected such a narrow reading. 127
 The court found that such a reading
conflicted with Congress's clear intent that Title VII was addressed to
employers, not • individuals.' 25
 Implicitly, the court used the rules of
statutory construction to support its decision. 129 Specifically, the court
relied on two rules.'" First, plain and unambiguous statutory lan-
guage need not be given effect when its literal interpretation would
lead to absurd or mischievous consequences or thwart the manifest
purpose of the statute.'" Second, words or clauses may be rejected as
surplusage if inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the
statute. 132
 As proof of Congress's intent to limit Title VII liability to
employers, the Second Circuit cited Title VII's statutory scheme and
remedial provisions which exempt employers with less than fifteen
employees.'" Because an individual supervisor could never be an
employer with fifteen or more employees, the court found that Title
VII simply does not impose individual liability upon supervisors. 134
Moreover, the Second Circuit found that the "and any agent" lan-
guage in Title VII's definition of employer should be interpreted as a
simple expression of respondeat superior: discriminatory actions
taken by an employer's agent create legal liability for the employer.'"
125 See Miller, 991 F.2(1 at 587.
12° See 66 F.3(1 at 1317.
127 See id. at 1314.
128 See id. at 1313-15.
129 See id.
13° See id.
131 See Tandta, 66 F.3d at 1313-15.
1 " See id. at 1314-15.
"5 See id.
154 See id. at 1314.
155 See id. at 1313-15.
March 2001]	 Sexual Harrassment Liabilrly 	 437
More recently, in 1996, in Haynes v. Williams, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit held that a supervisor could not be per-
sonally liable under Title 'VII. 136 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that Title
VIPs structure and remedial scheme indicated that suits against indi-
viduals are inappropriate and contrary to Congress's intent in enact-
ing Title VII.137 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit cited to the 1991 Civil
Rights Act's caps on compensatory and punitive damages as further
indication that Congress did not intend individual liability under Title
VII because Congress included no cap for individuals. 138 That omis-
sion, the Court reasoned, implied that Congress did not consider in-
dividuals liable. 139 Congress provided damage caps to avoid burdening
small entities with litigation costs."0 If Congress protected small enti-
ties with limited resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Con-
gress intended to allow civil liability to run against individual employ-
ees. 141
B. Federal District Courts in the First Circuit Disagree as to Whether
Supervisors May Be Sued as Individuals under Title VII for Sexual
Harassment
Over the past five years, the prevailing view among federal circuit
courts of appeal is that Title VII imposes no individual liability on su-
pervisors for sexual harassment. 1 42 Despite this growing consensus,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled on this issue and fed-
eral district courts within the First Circuit are split. 143 Some courts
have held that supervisors can be sued in their individual capacities
196 See 88 F.2d at 899 ("Under Title VII, suits against individuals must proceed in their
official capacity; individual capacity suits are inappropriate. The relief granted under Title
VII is against the employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a
violation of the Act. We think the proper method for a plaintiff to recover under Title VII
is by suing the employer, either by naming the supervisory employees as agents of the em-
ployer or by naming the employer directly.").
037 See id. at 899-901.
"8 See id. at 900-01.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See Haynes, 88 F.2d at 900-01.
142 See id. at 899 (collecting cases); see also McGrath, SUpea note 7, at 133-34 (same).
143 See Morrison, 108 F.3d at 444 (refusing to decide whether Title VII imposes individ-
ual liability); Harney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 32-33 (collecting cases and rejecting individual li-
ability); Meara, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 288 (same); Chatman, 973 F. Supp. at 228 (same); [(t-
amp°, 929 F. Stipp. at 562 (same); Ruffin°, 908 F. Supp. at 101 (allowing individual liability
under Title VII); Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515 (same); McGrath, supra note 7, at 133-134
(collecting cases and calling for the First Circuit Court of Appeals to resolve the contro-
versy over individual liability of supervisors for sexual harassment tinder Title VII).
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for sexual harassment under Title VII.'" According to these courts,
Congress intended the "and any agent" clause in Title VII to reach
supervisors in their individual capacities. 145 Because supervisors are
common law agents empowered by the employer to make economic
decisions such as hiring, promotion and firing that affect other em-
ployees under their control, they are statutory "employers." 146 As a
result, they may be held jointly and severally liable for conduct that
violates Title VII. 147 Generally, courts provide three reasons for inter-
preting Title VII to impose personal liability on supervisors for sexual
harassment. 148 First, a literal reading of the "and any agent" clause's
plain language indicates clearly and unambiguously that Congress
intended supervisors who qualify as agents of the employer to be per-
sonally liable. 149 Second, Title VII's broad remedial purpose is best
served by reading the "and any agent" clause to provide for joint and
several liability because the threat of individual liability deters supervi-
sors directly."° Third, a narrow reading of the "and any agent" clause
reduces it to mere surplusage. 151 This violates the longstanding rule of
statutory construction that every word and clause of a statute must be
given effect. 152
Throughout their opinions, courts imposing individual liability
on supervisors under Title VII rely for support on the rules of statu-
tory construction.'" Specifically, these courts rely—either implicitly
or explicitly—on the following rules:
o effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond
its text;
the language of remedial statutes will be liberally construed;
and
144 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffin°, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at
515.
145 See, e.g., Ruffin,,  908 F. Stipp. at 1047-49.
146 See id.
147 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318-24 (dissenting opinion).
148 See id.; see also Wyss, 24 F. Stipp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047-49; Weeks,
871 F. Stipp. at 515.
149 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318-24 (dissenting opinion); Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047-
49.
150 See Dinka, 66 F.3d at 1318-24 (dissenting opinion); Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047-
49; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515.
151 See Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047-49.
152 See id. at 1047.
153 See id. 1047-49.
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if language is plain and unambiguous it must be given ef-
fect. 164
For example, in 1994, in Weeks v. Maine, the United States District
Court for the District of Maine held that supervisors could be person-
ally liable under Title VII. 156 In Weeks, a tax examiner in the State of
Maine's Bureau of Taxation Enforcement Office sued her employer
and two of her former supervisors. 166 She claimed that the two super-
visors retaliated against her—in violation of Title WI—for filing sex
discrimination complaints against them. 157 The District Court held
that the supervisors could be personally liable under Title 'VII. 168 The
court reasoned that if supervisors could not be sued in their individ-
ual capacities, then 'they would not be sufficiently deterred by threat
of dismissal or discipline by the employer from engaging in conduct
violative of Title VII. 166 The court opined that this lack of deterrence
would undermine Title VII's "expansive" remedial purpose: "eradicat-
ing the evils of employment discrimination." 16° Explicitly, the Court's
opinion relied on the following rules of statutory construction: No
effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text, and
the language of remedial statutes Will be liberally construed. 161
Frequently, those federal courts that have imposed personal li-
ability on supervisors under Title VII cite to the dissenting opinion in
Tomka v. Seiler Corp. 162 There, the dissent argued that an "employer's
agent" could be held personally liable for discriminatory acts under
Title VII. 163 The dissent reasoned that the plain language of Title VII
allowed for personal liability because Title VII specifically defined
"employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a per-
154 See Indest, 164 F.3d at 258; Lissau, 159 F.3d at 177; Wathen, 115 F.3d at 400; Sheridan,
100 F.3d 1061 at 1077-78; Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901; Williams, 72 F.3d at 554; Tomka, 66 F.3d at
1313; Gary, 59 F.3d at 1399; Smith, 45 F.3d at 402; Miller; 991 F.2d at 587; Busby, 931 F.2d at
772; Homey, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33; Wyss, 24 F. Stipp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019;
Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at 515; Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 400 (listing rules).
165 See 871 F. Supp. at 517.
166 See id. at 516.
157 See id.
159 See id. at 517.
159 See id.
169 Weeks, 871 F. Stipp. at 517 ("shielding workplace supervisors fails to further the ex-
pansive remedial goal of Title VII....").
161 see id,
162 See 66 F.3d at 1318 (dissenting opinion); see also Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
165 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318.
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son."164
 The dissent based its argument on the rules of statutory inter-
pretation. 165
 Specifically, it found that the rules required a literal read-
ing of the statutory language. 166
 The dissent argued that Title VII's
plain language unambiguously provided for joint and several liability:
successful plaintiffs could recover all relief provided for by Title VII
against either the employer or any agent of the employer. 167 Further-
more, the dissent found that, in limiting the term "agent" in Title VII
to merely incorporate the doctrine of respondeat superior, the major-
ity read the statute too narrowly. 168
 According to the dissent, a narrow
reading of the "and any agent" clause conflicted with Congress's
avowed desire that Title VII be construed broadly, consistent with its
remedial purpose—ending discrimination in the workplace. 169
 Again,
the dissent relied upon the rules of statutory interpretation and con-
struction to support its conclusion. 170
Two months after the Tomka decision in 1995, the United States
District Court for the .District of Massachusetts held that supervisors
could be sued in their individual capacities under Title VII in Ruffino
v. State Street Bank and Trust Company. 171 In that case, a corporate man-
ager sued her employer and five supervisors alleging hostile work en-
vironment sexual harassment and retaliation.l' 72
 The supervisors filed
motions for summary judgment with the court, arguing that they
could not be sued in their individual capacities under Title VII. 173 The
court denied their motions for summary judgment. 174
 In reaching this
conclusion, the court rejected explicitly the Ninth Circuit's reasoning
in Miller that the "and any agent" clause was meant to incorporate the
doctrine of respondeat superior.'" The court found that the plain
meaning of Section 2000e(b) provided for joint and several liability





 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318-19.
169 See id.
179 See id. at 1319 ("1 dispute [the majority's] reading [of the statute] primarily because
I believe it violates two independent canons of statutory construction."). In Tomka, the
dissent was based in part on the rules of statutory construction which state: [t]o effect its
purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text and the language of remedial stat-
utes will be liberally construed. See id.
171 See 908 F. Supp. at 1047-48.
172 See id. at 1027-29.
173 See id. at 1047.
174 See id.
173
 See id. at 1048.
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holding that both employers, as entities, and their agents, as individu-
als, are liable for violations of Title VII. 176 Relying for support on the
rule of statutory interpretation which requires that every word and
clause must be given effect, the court found that the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation would reduce the "and any agent" clause to surplus-
age. 177 Implicitly, the court found that this interpretation would
clearly violate the rules of statutory construction and, therefore, held
that the "and any agent" clause meant that anyone who qualified as an
agent of a statutory employer could be held personally liable for vio-
lating Title VII. 178
More recently, in 1998, in Wyss u General Dynamics Corporation, the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island held that
supervisors were subject to individual liability under Title VII. 172 In
Wyss, the plaintiff sued her employer and her two immediate supervi-
sors alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title
VII. 180 Subsequently, the plaintiff's supervisors filed motions to dismiss
with the court arguing that they could not be sued under Title VII in
their individual capacities. 181 Denying their motions, the court held
that the employee-supervisors were subject to personal liability under
Title VII. 182 Referring to the dissent in Tontka as "the best reasoned
and most comprehensive opinion written on the subject," the court
relied heavily on that opinion's analysis and on the rules of statutory
construction to support its holding. 183 Applying the rules of statutory
interpretation, the court stated that it had to look first to Title VII's
plain language. 134 The court cited a "long-standing view of statutory
construction . . . grounded upon a jurisprudential interest in the
separation of federal powers under the Constitution," that courts
should not look beyond the plain language of a statute for its mean-
ing, if the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. 183
According to the court, to do so would amount to judicial usurpation
of legislative power. 186 Looking to Title VII's definition of employer,
178 See Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1048.
177 See Id. at 1047-48.
178 See id.
179 See 24 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
188 See id. at 203.
181 See id,




24 F. Supp. 2d at 205-06.
"8 See id.
186 See id.
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the court found that the "and any agent" clause was an unambiguous
statement providing joint and several liability for violations of Title
WI. 187
 Furthermore, the court found no internal conflict within Title
VII's language that would require another interpretation. 188 In addi-
tion, the court reasoned that this interpretation best served Title VII's
broad remedial purpose of discouraging discrimination. 189 Here, im-
plicitly, the court applied the rule of statutory interpretation that re-
medial statutes should be interpreted broadly to effect their pur-
pose. 19°
The court criticized the argument that it was inconceivable Con-
gress would cap damages on small employers in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act's amendments to Title VII and not mention caps on individuals if
it had contemplated individual liability under Title VII. 191
 The Court
found it logical, even likely, that Congress would protect small com-
panies without providing caps on damages for individual violators of
Title V11. 192
 Thus, the court found that individual supervisors are li-
able under Title V11. 195
 Here, the court invoked another rule of con-
struction: a court should not look for an "implication" of congres-
sional intent and should not infer intent from silence. 194
Furthermore, the court disputed the contention that the remedies
available to successful plaintiffs under the original Title WI—back pay
and equitable relief—indicated that Congress did not intend for indi-
viduals to be personally liable because these remedies are more read-
ily provided by employers. 195
 The court found this reasoning dubious
because individuals could just as easily be ordered to pay back wages
and be ordered to comply with court ordered injunctions to refrain
from discriminatory practices. 196
By contrast, other federal district courts within the First Circuit
have rejected individual Title VII liability of supervisors for sexual
harassment. 197
 The most recent example is Homey v. Westfield Gage
187 See id. at 206.
1 e49 See id.
189 Wyss, 24 F. Stipp. 2c1 at 205.
190 See id. at 209; Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 402.
191 Seell)us,24F. Supp. 2d at 209.




 See id. at 204.
196 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
197 See Homey, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33; Meara, 27 F. Sum). 2d at 288; Chat man, 973 F. Stipp.
at 228.
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Company. 198 In that case, the court granted a supervisor's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim holding that there is no individual
supervisor liability under Title VII. 199 The court relied in part on the
rule of statutory construction that the interpretation of a statute must
begin with its plain language and end there if the language is Imam-
biguous.m The court also relied on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Miller and the Second Circuit's reasoning in Tomka concerning the
language and remedial structure of Title VII. 20
III. THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ARE INSUFFICIENT TO
RESOLVE THE DISPUTE AS TO WHETHER TITLE WI IMPOSES
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY ON SUPERVISORS FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Courts' reliance on the rules of statutory construction to deter-
mine whether Title VII's "and any agent clause" provides for individ-
ual liability may mislead observers and practitioners into thinking that
applying the rules is sufficient to resolve this dispute. 202 Even a cur-
sory analysis of court opinions demonstrates that courts on both sides
of this issue—those holding no individual liability and those holding
supervisors personally liable—rely to a great extent on the rules of
statutory construction to support their conclusions. 203
108 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
199 See id. A motion to dismiss is a request posed by the defendant to the court request-
ing that a plaintiff's complaint be dismissed because it does not state a claim for which the
law provides a remedy. FED.R.Civn. P. 12(b).
200 See Homy, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
201 see a
202 See Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07 ("Judicial opinions in America are less formalis-
tic than they once were; courts are less prone to pretend that their conclusions follow by
ineluctable logic from premises found in earlier cases, without any leavening of policy or
common sense. But judicial opinions continue to pretend far more often than they should
that the interpretation of statutes is the mechanical application of well understood inter-
pretative principles—the canons [rules of statutory construction] to legislative materi-
als."); see also Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401.
405 See, e.g., Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 258 (5th Cir. 1999); Lis-
sau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998); Wathen v. General
Elec. Co. 115 F.3d 400, 403-06 (6th Cir. 1997); Sheridan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077-78 (3rd Cir. 1996); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 899-901
(10th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 554-55 (7th Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler
Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-16 (2d Cir. 1995); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir.
1995); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651-52 (5th Cir. 1994) cert. denied 513 U.S. 1015
(1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Intl, Inc., 991 F.2d 583,587-88 (9th Cir. 1993); Busby v, City of
Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991); Wyss v. Gen'l Dynamics, Corp., 24 F. Stipp. 2d
202, 204 (D.R.I. 1998); Ruffin() v. State Street Bank Sc Trust Co., 908 F. Stipp. 1019, 1047-
48 (0. Mass. 1995); Weeks v. State of Maine, 871 F. Supp. 515, 515 (0. Me. 1994).
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Some opinions seem to suggest that the straightforward applica-
tion of one or more rules of construction will lead unavoidably to the
"right" conclusion. 204
 This implication depends on at least two as-
sumptions—each of which may mislead practitioners and observers. 205
The first assumption is that, in interpreting the meaning of statutory
language, courts apply only the rules of statutory construction. 206
 The
second assumption is that applying one or more of the rules leads
mechanically to one "right" answer."7 The first assumption is mislead-
ing because, in reality, courts do not reach a particular result in inter-
preting a statute by applying only the rules of statutory construc-
tion. 208
 Even before looking to the "plain language" of the statute, all
courts—whether consciously or subconsciously—consider Congress's
purpose in enacting the statute, or the problem Congress sought to
redress.209
 The second assumption is misleading because, in any given
situation calling for the interpretation of statutory language, there are
at least two rules of statutory construction in direct opposition to each
other that courts can select to reach different "right" answers. 210
 For
every rule or canon of statutory construction, there is another equally
venerable but contradictory rule.2 t 1
 For example, the rule "a statute
cannot go beyond its text" can be contrasted with the rule "to effect
its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text."212
 There is
never only one "right" way to interpret statutory language using the
rules of statutory construction, there are always at least two. 215 For ex-
ample, in Ruffino, Weeks, and Wyss, the courts implied that their deci-
sions were based primarily on the rules of statutory construction; es-
pecially the rules which state:
no construction of a statute should be adopted if it makes
words or clauses in the statute redundant or meaningless;
in interpreting a statute all words should be given effect; and
2°4 See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1319; Ruffino, 908 F. Stipp. at 1048; Llewellyn, supra note
16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
208 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
2°6
 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
207
 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
208 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
209 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
210 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
211 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
212 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
218 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
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the language of remedial statutes will be liberally con-
strued. 2"
Explicitly, these courts found that interpreting the "and any
agent" clause in Title VIPs definition of "employer" to simply incor-
porate the doctrine of respondeat superior would reduce the clause
to "mere surplusage."215 The doctrine of respondeat superior, they
argued, would be applied under common law principles even absent
the "and any agent" clause. 216 As a result, the courts in Ruffino, Wyss
and Weeks found this interpretation of the "and any agent" clause re-
dundant and meaningless.217 Such an interpretation would violate the
statutory rules of construction that no interpretation of a statute
should be adopted if it makes words or clauses in the statute redun-
dant or meaningless, and the rule that all words of a statute should be
given effect.218
Further, the courts in Ruffino and Wyss found that the "and any
agent" clause is unambiguous. 219 Thus, reference to anything other
than the plain language of the "and any agent" clause is unneces-
sary. 220 For these courts, there simply is no question that Congress
meant supervisors, as agents with hiring and firing authority, to be
liable. 22' Seemingly, to support their conclusion that supervisors are
individually liable under Title VII, these courts would prefer to rely
exclusively on the most powerful rule of statutory construction—a
statute cannot go beyond its text. 222 This rule of statutory interpreta-
214 See Wyss, 24 F. Stipp. 2c1 at 204; Ruffian, 908 F. Supp. at 1047; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at
516-17.
2t5
	 4151,ss, 24 F. Stipp. 2t1. at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Stipp. at 1047; Weeks, 871 F. Stipp, at
516-17.
216 See W ' ss, 24 F. Stipp. 2d at 204; Ruffian, 908 F. Supp. at 1047; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at
516-17.
217 Sec Wyss,vt,  24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Stipp. at. 1047; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at
516-17.
vs See Wyss, 24 F. Stipp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at
516-17; Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805.•07.
219 See Wyss, 24 F. Stipp. 2d at 204; Ruffin°, 908 F. Stipp. at 1047.
228 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. Mat 204; Ruffian, 908 F. Supp. at 1047.
221 See 115,ss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffian, 908 F. Stipp. at. 1047.
222 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffin.o, 908 F. Supp. at 1047. This is the so-called
Golden Rule of statutory interpretation, which has been stated as follows: "The general
rule is perfectly well-settled that, where a statute is of doubtful meaning and susceptible
upon its face of two constructions, the court may look into prior and contemporaneous
acts, the reasons which adduced the act in question, the mischief intended to be remedied,
the extraneous circumstances, and the purpose intended to be accomplished by it, to de-
termine its proper construction. But where the act is clear upon its face, and when stand-
ing alone it is fairly susceptible of but one construction, that construction must be given to
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don means that, in general, courts will consider extrinsic evidence
such as legislative history, the structure of the act, and its purpose to
interpret the statute's language only if the language is facially vague
or ambiguous. 223
 Apparently, some courts would not look at anything
beyond the words "and any agent" to determine the meaning of this
clause. 224
 Thus, courts finding supervisors liable under Title VII arrive
at their holdings seemingly through a mechanical application of one
or more rules of statutory construction. 225
 Observers may be misled
into thinking that supervisors are liable under Title VII because the
rules of statutory construction demand this result. 226
Similarly, courts finding no individual liability of supervisors un-
der Title VII arrive at their holdings through an equally mechanical
application of one or more rules of statutory construction. 227
 These
courts, however, rely in most cases on conflicting rules. 228 For exam-
ple, in Miller and Tomka, the courts supported their rejection of indi-
vidual liability for supervisors under Title VII by relying on opposing
rules of statutory construction, such as:
Statutory language must not be given effect when the literal
interpretation would lead to absurd or mischievous conse-
quences or thwart the manifest purpose of the statute.229
The whole doctrine applicable to the subject may be summed up in the single ob-
servation that prior acts may be referred to solve but not to create an ambiguity." See Ken-
neth J. Vandevelde, Thinking Like a Lawyer, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, Westview 72
(Westview) (1996) (quoting Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414,420-21 (1899)).
223 See id.; cf. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 ("Courts must not be guided by
a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law,
and to its object and policy.").
224 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Stipp. at 1047.
225 See Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047; Llewellyn, supra note
16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
226
 SeeLlewellyn, supra note l6, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-08.
227 See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1213 Mlle starting point in any statutory construction
case, of course, is the language of the statute."); Chatman, 973 F. Supp. at 238 ("If the
words are a clear expression of congressional intent, the inquiry need go no further.");
Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
228 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07; compare,
e.g., Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1047-48 (every word and clause must be given effect) with
Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313-14 {if inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the stat-
ute, words or clauses may be rejected as surplusage).
229
 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. This rule of statutory construction
was stated most clearly in Cartledge u Miller: "So read, plaintiff may be correct, but, [o[n the
other hand, it is a commonplace that a literal interpretation of the words of a statute is not
always a safe guide to its meaning and should be disregarded when it defeats the manifest
purpose of the statute as a whole." 457 F. Stipp. 1146,1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Weinfeld, J.)
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The courts in Miller and Tomka found that interpreting the "and any
agent" clause to impose individual liability on supervisors was "incon-
ceivable" to Title VII's drafters because the statute as originally en-
acted was addressed only to employers and provided remedies only
employers could provide. 238 Thus, the courts in Miller and Tomka re-
lied on the rules of statutory construction to reject individual liability
for supervisors as an "absurd" or "mischievous" result."' Observers
may be misled into thinking that the rules of statutory construction
demand this result. 232 They should be aware of the limitations of the
rules of statutory construction.233 To avoid confusing practitioners
and observers, Courts should rely less on the rules of statutory con-
struction. 234 Instead', courts' should rely more on an examination of
Congress's purpose in enacting Title VII and the measures Congress
selected to effect this purpose. 235 By considering Congress's purpose
and chosen measures—as evidenced by the language and structure of
Title VII—it seems that the better reasoned view is that Congress did
not intend to impose Title VII liability on individual supervisors for
sexual harassment. 236
It is true that when viewed on its face and in isolation from the
rest of the statute, the "and any agent" clause suggests that individuals
who qualify as agents of the employer are individually liable.237
 Strict
reliance on the rule of construction which states that a statute's lan-
guage should be given effect if it is plain and unambiguous would
lead to the conclusion that supervisors are liable because they are
common law agents of the employer.238 Viewed in this way, it is not
(quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2(1. 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)
(L. Hand)).
2" See Tomka, 66 F.3(1 at 1314; Millen 991 F.2d at 587.
231 See Tontha, 66 F.3d at 1314; Millen 991 F.2d at 587.
232
 See Indest, 164 F.3d at 258; Lissau, 159 F.3d at 177; Wathen, 115 F.3d at 400; Sheridan,
100 F.3d 1061 at 1077-78; Haynes, 88 F.3d at 901; Williams, 72 F.3d at 554; Tomha, 66 F.3d at
1313; Gary, 59 F.3(1 at 1399; Smith, 45 E3c1 at 402; Miller, 991 F.2cl at 587; Busby, 931 F.2(1 at
772; 11.54s, 24 F. Supp. 2t1 at. 204; Ruffin°, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at. 515;
Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
2" See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
234 See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 399-401; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07.
2" See, e.g., Milks; 991 F.2d at 587; Posner, supra note 15, at 805-07. As an alternative to
using the rules of statutory construction to interpret a statute, Judge Posner suggests that a
judge should "try to think his way as best he can into the minds of the enacting legislators
and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar."/d. at 817.
433 See, e.g., Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32-36 (D. Mass. 2000);
McGrath, supra note 7, at 129-41; Posner, supra note 15, at 808.
437
 See 42	 § 2000e (b) (1994).
238 See id.; Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 401-05.
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implausible to argue that the "and any agent" clause is independent
from the first clause of the sentence and, therefore, plainly means
that "agents" are themselves "statutory employers" answerable directly
under Title VII's substantive sections. 288 When viewed in light of Title
VIPs language and structure and Congress's purpose in enacting Title
VII, however, this interpretation is untenable. 240
 Both Congress's pur-
pose in enacting Title VII and the statute's language and structure
indicate clearly that Congress meant only employers and not individ-
ual supervisors to be proper defendants in Title VII lawsuits.241
As the courts said in Miller, Tomka and Wathen, the language and
structure of Title VII, as originally enacted, indicate that Congress did
not contemplate individual liability of supervisors for sexual harass-
ment. 242
 The prohibitive sections of Title VII are addressed to "em-
ployers."243
 Title VII provides, in relevant part, that Id t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer H to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his [1 terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's [J sex." 244 Further,
Title VII defines employer as "a person engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . ." 248 Seemingly,
Congress limited Title VII liability to employers with 15 or more em-
ployees because employers have the most control over the work-
place. 246
 Thus, Congress placed the burden of liability on those enti-
ties in the best possible position to effect change and eliminate
discriminatory workplace practices to the greatest extent possible. 247
In addition, Congress's passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act with-
out mention of individual liability confirms that Congress did not in-
tend individual liability for supervisors under Title VII. 248 The lan-
guage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act indicates that Congress meant to
limit liability under Title VII to "employers" and not extend liability to
individual supervisors. 249
 If Congress had contemplated individual
239 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
24° See, e.g., Harney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 32-36; McGrath, supra note 7, at 129-41.
241 See, e.g., Homey, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 32-36; McGrath, supra note 7, at 129-41.
242 See Mallen, 115 F.3d at 400; Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313; Miller, 991 F.2(1 at 587;
242 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
244 Id.




 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1994); Homey, 95 F. Stipp. 2d at 32-36; McGrath, supra
note 7, at 137-38.
249 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1994); Homey, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 32-36; McGrath, supra
note 7, at 137-38.
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liability under Title VII for compensatory or punitive damages, it
would have included individuals in the listing of limitations on dam-
ages and would have discontinued the exemption for small employ-
ers. 250 Congress enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act in part because it
found that additional remedies were needed to deter employment
discrimination. 251 To effect this purpose, Congress made compensa-
tory and punitive damages available as additional remedies for viola-
tions of Title VII. 252. Before the Civil Rights Act was enacted, a court
could order injunctive relief, such as reinstatement, or award back pay
with interest on behalf of a successful Title VII plaintiff.253 Compensa-
tory damages could include amounts for future pecuniary losses,
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish and loss of
enjoyment of life.254 Punitive damages could be awarded under the
1991 Civil Rights Act to a plaintiff who shows that the defendant en-
gaged in discrimination with "reckless indifference" or "malice." 255
Importantly, though, Congress provided for limitations on the
amounts of compensatory and punitive damages a plaintiff could be
awarded.256 These limitations are based on the number of employees
employed by the defendant. 257 For example, employers employing
between fourteen and one hundred and one employees can be liable
to each plaintiff for a maximum amount of $50,000 in compensatory
and punitive damages. 258 A defendant-employer employing more than
500 employees 'could be liable for a maximum of $300,000.259 The
1991 Civil Rights Act does not address employers who employ less
than fifteen employees because they are not subject to Tide VII. 260
Nor does the 1991 Civil Rights Act address explicitly the liability of
individual employees for conduct that constitutes actionable employ-
ment discrimination.261 This sliding scale of liability does not stipulate
2" See Millen 991 F.2d at 587-88 & n. 2; Harney, 95 F. Stipp. 2d at 32-36; McGrath, supra
note 7, at 137-38.
25 ' See 42U.S.C. § 1981a(b).
252 See id.
255 See Harney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 32-36; McGrath, supra note 7, at 136-38.
251 See Harney, 05 F. Supp. 2d at 39-35; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137-38.
255 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b).
2" See id.; Harney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 34-35; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137-38.
2" See id.; Harney, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 34-35; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137-38.
258
 See id.; Homey, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 34-35; McGrath, supra note 7, at 137-38.
2" See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b).
26° See Millen 991 F.2d at 587-88 & n. 2.
201 See id.
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an amount in cases where a plaintiff seeks to hold an individual su-
pervisor liable. 262
The enacted version of Title VII represents a compromise be-
tween competing—and compelling—interests. 268 On the one hand, is
the employers' prerogative to control their businesses and workplaces
free from the interference of the courts acting as a super human re-
sources department.264
 On the other hand, of course, is the interest of
equal opportunity in the workplace.265 Moreover, Title VII represents
Congress's limited commitment of federal judicial resources to elimi-
nate—to the greatest extent possible—discrimination in the work-
place. 266
 The courts should respect Congress's limited commitment of
federal judicial resources. 267 Even if the current circumstances in the
workplace demand otherwise, which they do not currently, Congress,
not the courts, is the proper body empowered to address changed cir-
cumstances through statutory amendments. 268
Congress could have made all employers, regardless of size, re-
sponsible for discriminatory workplace practices. 269 Similarly, Con-
gress could have made any "person" legally responsible for discrimi-
natory workplace practices. 27° Yet, Congress did not incorporate these
more sweeping measures into the language of Title VII as it was en-
acted even though these measures would have been more effective in
262 See id.
263 See Posner, supra note 15, at 819; see also Association of Mexican-American Educa-
tors v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 601 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Congress adopted [Title VII] after one of the great legislative battles
of our time. [] The country suffered from massive direct and intentional race discrimina-
tion at that time. Considering the political challenge that [Title VII] posed for its advo-
cates, and the skill and consumption of political capital it required ... , we cannot assume
that Congress would have gone any further than it did. Reading statutes as if they said what
they do not say, in order to go further than the legislature did, vitiates careful legislative
compromises.").
264 See Keyes v. Secretary of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1025 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Cray v.
New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 792 F.2d 251, 255 (1st Cir. 1986)) (it is not
enough [to recover under Title VII] for the plaintiff to show that the employer made an
unwise business decision, or an unnecessary personnel move or that the employer
acted arbitrarily or with ill will.").
266 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78(1998).
266 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (1994); Association of Mexican American Educators, 231
F.3d at 601 ("Those who only got half a loaf from Congress frequently come to the federal
courts for the other half, but their snail ought to be forwarded to Capitol Hill.").
267 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq; Association of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d
at 601; Posner, supra note 15, at 819-22.
268 See, e.g., McGrath, supra note 7, at 141.
269 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
270 See id.
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furthering the purpose of eliminating discriminatory workplace prac-
tices. 271 Instead, Congress immunized employers who employ less
than fifteen employees in order to achieve a political compromise. 272
Through this compromise, Congress cut a wide swath through the
ranks of employers who had either actively promoted or passively tol-
erated overtly discriminatory workplace practices. 273 Congress did not,
however, ensure the complete eradication of discrimination in em-
ployment because some workplaces were intentionally left uncovered
by the statute.274
In Meritor Harris and Faragher, the United States Supreme Court
furthered Congress's purpose by interpreting Title VII to prohibit
sexually hostile work environments. 275 Certainly, pockets of sex-based
discrimination still exist in workplaces throughout the country; how-
ever, unlike the situation before Title VII, it is the rare employer today
who does not have and enforce workplace procedures designed to
prevent and correct sexual harassment. 276 Indeed, only employers
who implement policies to detect and eliminate sexual harassment
may successfully invoke the affirmative defense provided by the
United States Supreme Court in Ellerth and Faragher. 277 Employers who
employ less than fifteen employees and are, therefore, not answerable
under Title VII are deterred similarly, though perhaps not to the same
degree, by state anti-discrimination and tort laws. 278 We have paid for
the benefit of less employment discrimination through the operation
of Title VII in increased litigation in the federal courts and adminis-
trative filings with state anti-discrimination agencies and the EEOC. 279
Today, employment discrimination litigation comprises almost ten
percent of the federal court docket. 28°
271 set. id.
272 See id.; Association of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 601 ("If we do not re-
spect the compromises legislators make, how shall they be induced to make them?"); Pos-
ner, supra note 15, at 819-22.
276 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790
(1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 17 (1993); Merkur Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62-70 (1986).
271 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (b)
276 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790; Harris, 510 U.S. 17; Met-Ron 477 U.S. at (35.
276 See Faragher 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65
(1998).
277 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65
(1998).
278 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 151B § 4 (5) (1996).
276 See Kohler, supra note 40, at 106.
28° See id.
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The return on Congress's investment—harassment-free work-
places for the majority of employees—has been worth the expense.
Allowing supervisors to be sued individually in the federal courts for
violations of Title VII, however, would mean a significantly increased
expense in terms of federal judicial resources. 281 Congress did not
contemplate this level of commitment in 1965 when Title VII was en-
acted.282
 Moreover, in enacting Title VII, Congress did not intend to
create a freestanding federal tort whereby individuals could be held
liable directly.283
 In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that Con-
gress intended a limited statutory scheme and did not intend to enact
a "general civility code."284
 Thus, allowing plaintiffs to sue workplace
supervisors in their individual capacities represents an expansion of
the field of sex discrimination litigation that Congress did not in-
tend.285
 Apparently, some courts have found that circumstances have
changed significantly since 1965, warranting a expansion in the
commitment of federal judicial resources to eradication sexual har-
assment of workers by supervisors: 286
 Even if this were an accurate de-
scription of the current environment, Congress and not individual
federal district courts are the legislative body properly empowered to
make this further commitment of limited resources. 287 Limiting liabil-
ity under Title VII to employers conserves scarce judicial resources
and preserves the balance of power between the legislative and judi-
cial branch.288
281 See id.
282 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994); Association of Mexican American Educators, 231
F.3d at 601.
283 See, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1316.
"4 See, e.g., Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
283 See id.
288
 See 'Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 204; Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019; Weeks, 871 F. Supp. at
515; see also Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 397 (noting that the sense of the situation as seen
by the court"—here the prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace—affects the
court's choice of techniques for interpreting statutes).
"7 See McGrath, supra note 7, at 141; Posner, supra note 15, at 810.
2" See McGrath, supra note 7, at 141; Posner, supra note 15, at 810; see also AIC Sec. In-
vestigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1282 ("The employment discrimination statutes have broad
remedial purposes and should be interpreted liberally, but that cannot trump the narrow,
focused conclusion we draw from the structure and logic of the statutes. Congress has
struck a balance between deterrence and societal cost, and we will not upset that bal-
ance.").
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CONCLUSION
Court opinions' interpreting the "and any agent" clause in Title
VII's definition of "employer" rely excessively on the rules of statutory
construction. Observers and practitioners may be mislead into think-
ing that applying the rules of construction is sufficient to resolve the
dispute over individual liability of supervisors under Title VII. Instead,
courts should emphasize Congress's purpose in enacting Title VII as
evidenced by the entire statute's language and structure. Using this
approach, the better reasoned view is that, in enacting Title VII, Con-
gress's purpose was to eliminate discriminatory employment practices
to the greatest extent possible using a limited commitment of federal
judicial resources. The better reasoned view is that Congress and the
United States Supreme Court in Ellerth and Faragher chose to use the
employer to police its supervisors rather than hold supervisors indi-
vidually liable. As a result, employers—not supervisors in their indi-
vidual capacities—are the proper defendants in Title VII lawsuits.
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